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I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
In this case, Prepaid Dental Services, Inc., Appellant
herein, petitioned the court below for a Declaratory Judgment
declaring that the Findings and Order of Roger

c.

Day,

Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Utah, herein
Respondent, were inconsistent with the definition of
"Insurance" set forth in Section 31-1-7 of t~e Utah Code
Annotated (1953) and the definition of a "Health Maintenance
Organization" within the provisions of Title 31, Chapter 42,
Utah Code Annotated (1953).
II.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
The court below issued a Memorandum Opinion which
sustained the Findings and Order of the Insurance Department
and dismissed Appellant's Petition.
III.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the decision by the
lower court which sustained the Findings and Order of the
Insurance Commissioner, together with a Declaration by the
court that the Appellant's proposed plan constitutes neither
Insurance within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated Section
31-1-7 or a Health Maintenance Organization within the meaning
of Title 31, Chapter 42 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953).

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant and Respondent have stipulated to the
following facts:
1.

Appellant is a Utah corporation in good standing.

2.

Respondent is the Commissioner of Insurance of the

State of Utah.
3.

The Respondent issued Findings and Order dated August

8, 1979, regarding the proposed operations of Appellant stating
in effect that the plan proposed by Appellant constitutes
"insurance" within the definition set forth in Section 31-1-7,
Utah Code Annotated (1953), and that the proposed operations of
Appellant also fall within the definition of a nHealth,
Maintenance Organizationn within the provisions of Title 31,
Chapter 42, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
4.

Appellant has not commenced to do business within the

State of Utah.
5.

The business operations which Appellant desires to

carry on within the State of Utah are as follows:
a.

Appellant would contract with employers to

arrange for specific dental services to be provided to the
employer's employee·s (hereinafter "Participantsn) on a prepaid
basis.
b.

Appellant would contract with dentists licensed

to practice dentistry in Utah to perform the specific dental
services listed in the Dental Group Agreement, annexed hereto
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as Exhibit "A", at no charge to the Participants other than the
fixed monthly charge set forth in the Dental Group Agreement.
c.

The Dental Health Care Plan would operate on a

system where the Participants would be required to have the
Available Dental Services and Co-Payment Services provided by
Specific Dentists rather than by a dentist chosen by the
Participant.
d.

The documents attached hereto as Exhibits "A",

"B" and "C", and entitled, respectively, "Dental Group
Agreement", "Employer Group Agreement" and "Master Contract",
are the legal documents that would govern the operation of
Appellant's dental health care plan and set forth the rights
and obligations of the

parti~s

involved.

[Copies of Exhibits

"A", "B", an_d "C" are found in the record at page 73, 90, 93,
respectively.]
6.

Appellant does not provide "basic health care

services" as defined under Section 31-42-3(6), Utah Code
Annotated (1953).

Under this definition the organization is

required to provide as a minimum, emergency care, in-patient
hospital and physician care, out-patient medical services, and
out-of-area coverage.
7.

According to the Order issued by Respondent, Appellant

is enjoined from operating its proposed dental health care plan
without a Certificate of Authority from the Utah Insurance
Department and would have to expand its proposed services
offered to include "basic health care services" as defined
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in the proceeding paragraphs to be eligible to qualify for
licensing as a Health Maintenance Organization.
The court, after receiving memoranda from both
Appellant and Respondent and after hearing the argument of
counsel, issued its Memorandum Opinion without taking
additional evidence.

The court below sustained the Findings

and Order of the Respondent and held that the substance of the
transaction proposed by Appellant is an insurance transaction
and is thereby covered by Title 31 of the Utah Code Annotated.
Specifically, the court found that there was both a distribution
of risk and assumption of that risk under the Dental Group
Agreement and the performance bond, holding that "Participants
are third party beneficiaries of that contract."
It is Appellant's contention as set out below that the
Finding by the court that there is an assumption of the risk

by

Prepaid Dental Services, Inc. is without foundation in the
evidence and is, as a matter of law, erroneous.

It is further

Appellant's contention that Appellant's proposed plan does not
subject it to regulation as a Health Maintenance Organization
or in any other way subject it to regulation under the
Insurance Code of the State of Utah.

As such, Appellant

respectfully requests the court for an Order reversing the
trial court's determination that Appellant's proposed plan
constitutes "Insurance", together with an Order allowing
Appellant to conduct business, without further interference
from Respondent.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE PLAN PROPOSED BY PDS IS NOT INSURANCE

Section 31-1-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953) defines
"insurance" as follows:
Insurance is a contract whereby one
undertakes to indemnify another or pay
or allow a specified or ascertainable
_amount or benefit upon determinable
risk contingencies.
Justice Crockett, in his concurring opinion in In Re
Clark's Estate, 10 Utah 2d 427, 354 P.2d 112 {1960), and which
opinion was expressly approved of and adopted by the court in
Utah Funeral Directors and Embalmers Association v. Memorial
Gardens of the Valley, 17 Utah 2d 227, 408 P.2d 190 {1965), set
forth the basic elements of a contract of insurance:
"Insurance" is an agreement that, for a
premium it receives, the insurer will
pay to a beneficiary a stated sum upon
the happening of a contingency such as
death, or other loss. It involves risk
on the part of the insurer to pay on
the happening of the contingency and a
spreading of the risk over the group
who pay the premiums. Or, as sometimes
stated, insurance involves riskshifting and risk-distributing. Id. at
119.
Central to the concept of insurance is indemnification, or
assumption of the risk by the insurer, or as stated by Justice
Crockett in "risk-shifting" from the insured to the insurer.
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Relevant case law from other jurisdictions concures in
this concept and holds that even where there is a distribution
of the risk over a larger group but no assumption of that risk
by a party, that party is not an insurer.

Thus the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jordan
v. Group Health Association, 107 F. 2d 239 (1939), a case with
facts very similar to those in the present case, stated:
Whether the contract is one of
insurance or of indemnity there must be
a risk of loss to which one party may
be subjected by contingent or future
events and an assumption of it by
legally binding arrangement by
another. Even the most loosely stated
concepts of insurance and indemnity
require these elements. Hazard is
essential and equally so a shifting of
its incidence. If there is no risk, or
there being one it is not shifted to
another or others, there can be neither
insurance nor indemnity. Insurance
also, by the better view, involves a
distribution of the risk, but
distribution without assumPtion hardly
can be held to be insurance. These are
elemental concepts and controlling
~·
Id. at 245 (emphasis added)
Assumption of the risk from the insured to the insurer is a
critical factor that must be present before a contract can be
deemed to be "insurance".
Under the plan proposed by PDS there is a risk.

That

risk is that any individual Participant will have need of the
specific dental services enumerated in the Dental Group
Agreement.

It can be argued that there is a distribution of

this risk among the several Participants who share the same
risk~

however, a more accurate description would be the joining
-10-
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together of a number of persons who will need dental care in
order to obtain a discount price for such dental care.

But

assuming, arguendo, that there is a distribution of risk under
the Prepaid Dental Plan, the basic insurance equation fails in
that PDS does not assume that risk.
Section 2.02 of the Master Contract, Record P. 99,
clearly states that PDS' obligation to the Participant is not
to indemnify him for any dental loss he might suffer, but to
"use its best efforts to obtain the services of qualified,
licensed professionals and their staffs to provide and perform
the applicable available dental services to eligible
participants."

Once PDS has used its best efforts to arrange

for the specific dental services to be performed, it has
fulfulled its contractual obligation to the Participant.

Under

Section 5.03 of the Master Contract, Record P. 106-107, if PDS
is unable, by using its best efforts, to obtain the services of
professionals and their staffs to render the specified dental
services to the Employer Group for a period of 30 days after
the date upon which such services first became unavailable, the
contract between PDS and the Employer Group terminates without
further obligation of any of the parties to the other.
A simple way to demonstrate the absence of an
assumption of the risk by PDS is to examine the hypothetical
situation under PDS' plan in which PDS has arranged for a
Dental Group to perform the dental services, but the
Participant is unable to obtain the dental services from the
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Dental Group, and PDS, after using its best efferts is unable
to arrange for a substitute Dental Group to provide the
services for a period exceeding 30 days.

If, in this

situation, the Partcipant could hold PDS liable, then there
would have been an assumption of the risk by PDS.

Clearly this

is not the case, as PDS would be liable to the participant only
if it had failed to use its best efforts to arrange for a
Dental Group to provide the services.
Not only does PDS not assume the risk but neither has
the Dental Group assumed the risk.

Under the provisions of

Article XII of the Dental Group Agreement, Record P. 79,
between PDS and the Dental Group, the Dental Group must provide
a performance bond in an amount equal to the estimated annual
payment due from each Employer Group.

The terms of such

performance bond provide that in the event the Dental Group
fails for any reason to perform the required services the
bonding company will pay such other licensed dentist as may be
designated by the Participant to perform the specific dental
services described in the Dental Group Agreement.

Thus, if the

Dental Group failed for any reason to perform any of the
specified dental services the Participant would rely on the
performance bond to have those services performed by another
dentist of his choice.
The bond which is required of the Dental Group is not,
as suggested in the court's opinion below, a factor which lends
weight to the proposition that PDS' plan is one of insurance.
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Rather, the insurance company or other entity which issues the
performance bond to the Dental Group, insuring the Dental
Group's performance is already licensed and regulated.

The

risk is assumed by the Dental Group's performance bond not by
PDS.

It is noted that the services provided by PDS are offered
only to select employer groups and not the public at large.
There is considerably more protection in a program only offered
to employee groups who are better able to determine the
adequacey of the plan than might an individual member of the
public.
Clearly PDS' contractual obligation to "use its best
efforts" to obtain licensed professionals to perform the dental
services does not make it an insurer under the Utah statute.
Section 31-1-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides, in
pertinent part:
Insurance is a contract whereby one
undertakes to •.• allow a ••• benefit upon
determinable risk contingencies.
PDS' use of "best efforts" is not a benefit it undertakes to

allow upon determinable risk contingencies.

It is a

contractual obligation which PDS undertakes to perform whether
or not the Participant ever has need of any of the dental
services.

PDS' obligation to arrange for dental groups to

provide dental services is the same whether any one participant
ever has need for the dental services.

PDS' obligation is a

contractual obligation that is in no way based upon a
possibility that any one participant or group of participants
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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could have a serious dental problem above and beyond the
routine servies PDS has arranged for.

In any event PDS is not

liable to perform the services or pay for them if they are not
performed.

Thus PDS' obligations are not based upon

"determinable risk contingencies."
To hold under these Facts that the contractual
obligation to use one's best efforts was contemplated under the
Utah insurance statute would be to, potentially, transform all
service contracts, and indeed all contracts, into insurance
contracts.

By way of example, a law firm which works on a

retainer basis has never been considered to be an insurer that
all the demands made by the retainer will be met or that they
will be met timely.

However~

as PDS has contracted to use its

best efforts to arrange for dental services on a prepaid basis,
so the law firm may contract to use its best efforts to provide
legal services on a prepaid basis.
an insurer.

Neither is a

gua~antor

or

Best efforts is all professionals can deliver.

In his Findings and Order issued August 8, 1979, the
Commissioner found that if PDS' obligation to use its "best
efforts" was not an assumption of the risk, it would be a
meaningless consideration and the proposed plan could be a
fraud.

Addressing this issue, the court in Jordan, supra,

stated:
Group Health assumes no liability, if
for any reason it becomes unable to
procure any or all such services when
called upon to do so, or to indemnify
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the member for failure of the physician
to keep his arrangement or perform it
properly, and its only obligation in
such a case is "to use its best efforts
to procure the needed services from
another source • • • • "
Tenuous the obligation may be, but that
does not render it illegal, or make it
a contract of insurance or one of
indemnity. Correlatively tenuous is
the member's responsibility to Group
Health. Id. at 244 (emphasis is the
courts).
Under a best efforts contract, PDS has real and
substantial obligations, which are not illusory nor are they,
on the other hand, an assumption of the risk of providing the
enumerated dental services for the Participants.

In Blore v.

Falstaff Brewing Corporation, 454 F.Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
the court had occasion to construe a best efforts contract.
The court stated that "' [blest efforts' is a term which
necessarily takes its meaning from circumstances" and that the
"parties' capability" who contracted to use its best efforts
must be determined to see if it fulfilled its contractual
obligation under the contract

The court concluded that the

best efforts contract obligated the promissor to act "in good
faith and to the extent of its own total capabilities •••• "
Id • at 267.
In Group Health Association v. Sheppard, 37 A.2d 749
(Mun. Ct. of App. for D.C. 1944), the court held that
"inability is far different than refusal" in declaring that the
Group Health Association would not be liable "for a mere
inability to prefect the member" under a best efforts
obligation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

Blore v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation, supra, and
Group Health clearly demonstrate the parameters of the
oglibation PDS has taken upon itself when it contracted to "use
its best efforts" to obtain licensed professionals to perform
the dental services mentioned in the contracts.

Best efforts

is not an illusory obligation but extends to the total
capabilities of PDS.

Clearly, this is a valid consideration to

support a contract. It is also clearly not the obligation to
procure the services in the event it is unable after using its
best efforts to obtain those services.

In the event it is

unable to procure the described dental services for the
Participants after having used its best efforts, PDS has no
further obligation to Participant.

PDS would, as in Group

Health, be liable to a Participant in the event it refused or
failed to use its best efforts.

However, as the court stated

in Group Health, an "inability is far different than refusal."
It is also far different from the duty to procure services
under any circumstances as has been claimed by Respondent.
What PDS offers to the Participant is a contract for
services rather than a contract for insurance.

A prepaid

services plan identical in all material respects to that
proposed by PDS was held not to be insurance in Fishback v.
Universal Service Agency, 151 P. 768 (Wash. 1915), the court
finding that:
••• [I l t seems to be wanting in the
principal essential necessary to make
it an insurance contract. Clearly
there is no hazard or peril whereby the
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purchasers of these contracts may
suffer loss or injury, which the
respondent insures against. It does
not guarantee that any of the
contracting parties, even the
physician, will perform the services
agreed upon. On the contrary, in the
paragraph lettered "V" of its offer of
benefits it expressly declares that it
"assumes no liability for the breach of
any one or all of such contracts." It
is true that it does say in the same
paragraph that in the event of a breach
of the agreement by the dealers or
physician it will use its best efforts
to procure other persons or firms to
offer the same or a similar service.
But this, while it may require the
respondent to use reasonable diligence
to procure another person to perform
the services in case the contracting
party for any reason fails therein, and
may render it liable to the contract
holder in damages if it should fail to
exercise such diligence, it is in no
sense a guarantor or an insurer that
the service will be performed. There
is therefore, as we see it, no hazard
or peril insured against, and, the
transaction being lacking in this
essential element, it is not an
engaging in the insurance business. Id.
at 772.
(Emphasis added.)
Virtually every other case which has dealt with
prepaid services organizations has held that such plans do not
constitute insurance.

See Jordan v. Group Health Association,

supra1 California Physicians' Service v. Garrison, 172 P.2d 4
(Cal. 1946)1 and, Barmeier v. Oregon Physicians' Service, 243
P.2d 1053 (Ore. 1952).

Likewise the Attorneys General of both

New Mexico and Arizona have recently issued opinion letters
finding plans identical to that of PDS not to be insurance
Based upon the absence of an assumption of the risk by the
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prepaid dental service company, the Arizona Attorney General
found that:
The majority of cases dealing with the
subject of prepaid health plans hold
that a corporation, whether or not
organized for profit, the object of
which is to provide members of a group
with health care services, is not
engaged in the insurance business.
See, ~, Jordan v. Group Health
ASS'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
Both of the plans that you have
submitted to us provide for the
rendering of dental services to the
members of the plans. They do not
purport to indemnify anyone against
risk of loss or expense growing out of
occurrences requiring dental care.
Accordingly, neither plan constitues
insurance.
These opinion letters are included in the Record at pages 192
and 193 respectively.
Indeed, in addressing the issue of whether or not the
plan proposed by PDS is "insurance" and in attempting to
justify his conclusion that it is, Special Assistant to the
Utah Attorney General William Gibbs stated in his opinion
letter to the Commissioner of Insurance that he was "aware that
this position is contrary to that which has been taken in
Arizona, New Mexico, California and Washington" based on the
same fact situation, record p. 197.

Assumption of the risk is

still a vital part of Utah's statute no matter how broad or
narrow it may be.
The fact that there may be an assumption of the risk
by the Dental Group when they obtain a performance bond does
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not melt the Dental Group into PDS.

They are seperate,

distinct organizations who have contracted with one another at
arms length.

The District Court suggests they are one and

refers to the transaction as if the court were piercing a
corporate veil.

The relationship between PDS (Administrators)

and the dental group (Dentists) is that of independent
contractors not as principal and agent.

The District Court

erred in holding that the contractual duties of one was the
contractual duty of the other.
This is clearly a proper and inexpensive way to
deliver a limited dental service.
POINT II
PDS IS NOT A HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
UNDER THE UTAH CODE

The District Court did not address the issue of
whether or not PDS was a HMO.

The District Court affirmed that

part of the Commissioner's order without comment.

It is thus

our intent to state the reasons we do not believe that a
company that only offers dental benefits can be regulated under
a statute that requires all within its reach to offer
comprehensive medical, surgical, hospital benefits.

Simply

stated, did the legislature intend to regulate only full
service HMO's; or, did they not intend to include single
service organizations.

It is a matter of statutory

construction.
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In his Findings and Order issued August 8, 1979,
Exhibit "A", the Commissioner found that the plan proposed by
PDS qualified it as a "Health Maintenance Organization" under
the provisions of Title 31, Chapter 42, Utah Code Annotated
(1953)

(hereinafter "the Utah HMO Act").
Section 31-42-3(4) of the Utah HMO Act defines "Health

Maintenance Organization" as follows:
Any person ••• who furnishes, either
directly or through arrangements with
others, health care to an enrolled
member in return for periodic payments;
the amounts of said payments are agreed
upon prior to the time during which the
health care may be furnished; and who
is obligated to the member to arrange
for or to directly provide available
and accessable health care.
The declaration of public policy contained in Section
31-42-2 of the Utah HMO Act, and given as a guide to the

interpretation thereof, demonstrates that the Act was passed to
(1) allow the State to make sure that organizations purporting

to provide comprehensive health care are able to deliver the
wide range of benefits which they offer;

(2) to remove the

"legal barrier" that HealtK care companies are not insurance1
and, (3) thus, to allow the state through the Department of
Insurance to regulate these organizations:
The legislature wishes to eliminate
legal barriers to the establishment of
health maintenance organizations which
provide readily available accessible
and quality comprehensive health care
to their members and to encourage their
development as an alternative method of
health care delivery. The State of
Utah must have reasonable assurance
-20Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that health maintenance organizations
offering health plans within this state
are financially and administratively
sound and that such organizations are
in fact able to deliver the benefits
which they offer. (Emphasis added).
While it is true that the statutes of this state "are
to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of
the statutes and to promote justice," Section 68-3-2, Utah Code
Annotated (1953), it is also the law of this state that "it is
equally true that they should not be distorted beyond the
intent of the legislature."

Stanton Transportation Company v.

Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959).

See also Eccles

Lumber Company v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906).
The intent of the Utah Legislature in enacting the
Utah HMO Act is clearly set forth within the Act itself:

"to

eliminate legal barriers to the establishment of health
maintenance organizations which provide readily available
accessible and quality comprehensive health care," and to
enable the state to make sure "that such organizations are in
fact able to deliver the benefits which they offer."
31-42-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953).

Section

To interpret this Act as

intending to prohibit the operation of single service health
organizations, such as PDS, would distort the act well beyond
the intent of the legislature.
One of the chief reasons that the state desired to
regulate comprehensive health care providers was that these
Health care policies were being offered to the general public.
In the instant case, PDS would only offer its plan to select
employer groups.
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Because PDS would offer its plan only to select Employer
groups, there is not the same public need to be served by
regulating PDS as there would be if the plan were offered to
the general public.
The legislature dealt only with the regulating of
comprehensive health care providers and, for whatever reason,
did not undertake to regulate single service health
organizations.

In Point IV of his Memorandum of Points and

Authorities to the court below, the Respondent conceded that
the Utah Legislature did not intend to regulate single service
health organizations under the Utah Health Maintenance
Organization Act:
It is true, as PDS claims, that the legislature did
not intend to regulate single service corporations
under the Health Maintenance Organization Act.
Respondent's Brief, page 14, Record at page 213.
The Respondent has argued in the court below that
because single service health organizations are not
specifically allowed under the terms of the Utah Health
Maintenance Organization Act, they are therefore prohibited.
The proper rule of statutory construction is to the contrary.
In Hansen v. Board of Education, 116 P.2d 936 (Utah 1941) the
court stated at 940:
"It is a well established rule of construction that
where a statute grants a power or right the powers not
mentioned in the enumeration are intended to be
excluded."
The legislature has granted the Commissioner the right to
regulate comprehensive health care provides under the Utah HMO
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act, not single service organizations such as PDS.

As the Utah

Legislature has not undertaken to regulate single service
health corporations such as PDS, any such regulation should
await further legislative action unless it can be demonstrated
that the proposed plan for a single service health organization
is regulated by some other statute.

CONCLUSION

The Commissioner of Insurance has found that PDS would
be both an insurer and an Health Maintenance Organization if it
operated its proposed prepaid dental service plan in Utah.

In

reality it would be neither.
PDS would not be an insurer under Utah statutory and
case law in that it would neither indemnify the Participant nor
would it undertake to allow a benefit upon determinable risk
contingencies.

In short, there would not be a shifting of the

risk from the Participant to PDS or any other party.
plan is not insurance.

Thus the

To hold otherwise would be to depart

from all accepted definitions of insurance and substantially
broaden the Utah

s~atutory

definition thereof.

PDS is not to be subject to the provisions of the Utah
HMO Act as it is a single service health organization and not

an organization purporting to offer a comprehensive health care
plan to the public.
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For these reasons Petitioner contends that
Respondent's interpretation of Section 31-1-7 and Title 31,
Chapter 42, Utah Code Annotated (1953) with respect to
Petitioner's proposed plan is incorrect and respectfully
requests that the Court issue an appropriate order and judgment
determining PDS to be neither an insurer nor a Health
Maintenance Organization under Utah Law, and order the State
Insurance Commissioner to desist from interfering with the
operation of PDS.
DATED

71':
thi~/5-aay

of February, 1980.

SENIOR & SENIOR

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two co~s of the foregoing
APPELLANTS BRIEF were mailed this /.,?- _. day of February, 1980,
to William G. Gibbs Attorney for Respondent at 351 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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